Towards a Democratic Developmental State by White, Gordon
‘In Third World conditions, Western-style
democracy is as much use as a three-piece suit in
the desert.’ (anonymous Sudanese military official)
Introduction
If the 1980s saw the rise of a new orthodoxy about
the developmental role of states, the early 1990s
have seen the rise of a new orthodoxy about the
developmental role of political regimes. The former
criticised the developmental states of the post-
colonial era for excessive economic dirigisme,
advocating a reduction in their role and a freeing up
of markets and private enterprise along neo-liberal
lines. The latter extended this to a critique of political
dirigisme, emphasising the developmental deficiencies
of authoritarian regimes as well as their denial of
human rights and civil freedoms and advocating a
transition to democracy along liberal lines. By the
mid-1990s, these two critiques have coalesced into a
comprehensive strategic vision of both political and
economic probity, according to which development
can best be promoted through a market-friendly
state presiding over a predominantly capitalist
economy operating within the political ‘shell’ of a
liberal democratic polity. 
The economic and political components of this vision
are logically interconnected: markets and private
enterprise provide the basis for political pluralism and
the institutionalised limits which the liberal polity
imposes on the concentration of political power
serve to curb any tendency towards economic
dirigisme. The parameters of ‘sound’ developmental
action are thus transformed and narrowed: in
economic terms, the developmental state of the
1960s and 1970s becomes an anachronism to be
replaced by a state whose functions are primarily
regulatory; in political terms, regime options are
reduced to a model of liberal democracy defined
primarily in conventional procedural terms.1
Alternatives are not only not advisable but are also
not feasible, not least because liberal politics and
economics at the national level are embedded
within, and reinforced, by a global system in which
markets reign supreme and the political atmosphere
favours the extension and perpetuation of
democratic regimes.
This image of developmental correctness is grossly
unexamined and begs a lot of fundamental questions.
As a model of economic development it is riddled
with contradictions and susceptible to the same kind
of criticisms which were levelled against growth-
oriented conceptions of development in the late
1960s by Dudley Seers and Hans Singer among
others. This article is about the political economy of
this strategy, specifically the relationships between
political and economic variables that it envisages and
their implications for development. My analysis is
based on two basic assumptions: first, that many
countries in the erstwhile Second and Third Worlds
are yet to make the developmental transition in
socioeconomic terms and the countries that have
done this definitively (such as the East Asian NICs –
newly industrialised countries) are still relatively few;
and, second, that the process of development
involves more than just economic growth but also
life-and-death issues of poverty, personal security,
distributive equity, social justice and environmental
sustainability. The tsunami of democratisation over
the past decade has brought liberal democratic
institutions to numerous countries which still face
this developmental challenge.2 Will this change in
political regime improve the capacity of developing
societies to tackle it effectively? 
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At first glance, one is inclined towards scepticism.
Economic historians tell us that many of the early
wave of successful developers, such as Japan,
Germany and Russia, did so under political
circumstances that could hardly be called democratic;
that in the great forerunner, the UK, the
developmental breakthrough preceded
democratisation; and, more recently, that the
exceptional developmental successes of East Asia
were all achieved under authoritarian auspices.
Recent cases of successful developmental transition
under democratic regimes are hardly legion
(Botswana, of course, and Mauritius) and, while it is
evident that many of the authoritarian
developmental states of the post-colonial era have
been egregiously unsuccessful, this is not in itself
evidence that a change of regime would make a
positive difference. While it is currently convenient
to attribute their lack of success to predatory elites,
it should also be pointed out that they were also
undermined by the character of the societies in
which they were embedded and overwhelmed by
the developmental constraints and challenges they
faced, both domestically and internationally. As with
their democratic counterparts, authoritarian regimes
also need certain ‘preconditions’ to be politically
authoritative and developmentally effective; if these
have been lacking, then their democratic successors
may well run up against the same problems with the
same debilitating political and economic
consequences. But even if we assume for the
moment that new democratic regimes can be
consolidated, does democracy make a developmental
difference and if so, how? 
Democracy and development: some variant
views
While it is common to find Western politicians and
political commentators on development waxing
eloquent about the positive developmental
consequences of democratisation, there is by no
means a consensus on the issue among development
professionals and analysts. First, there is an optimistic
view, common among aid circles (particularly in
Western national aid agencies and international
institutions), that liberal democracy is a powerful
stimulus to development, basically because it provides
a more conducive environment for market-led
economic development and because it carries the
potential for more efficient and accountable
government.3 Though this optimistic view is most
commonly found among liberals and neo-liberals, it is
also shared, albeit in a different form and for
different reasons, by people across a much wider
political spectrum, including democratic socialists and
advocates of participatory development who see
democracy as opening spaces for developmentally
positive forms of popular mobilisation. 
Particularly in societies with recent histories of
autocratic, incompetent or corrupt authoritarian
regimes, this view has obvious attractions, but as a
general proposition the case is somewhat shaky. First,
while it may be true that there is a long-term
statistical correlation between democracy and
prosperity, this says little about their causal
relationships in the short and medium terms,
particularly in the earlier stages of development.
Moreover, even if it were true, as The Economist
claims, that ‘far from inhibiting growth, democracy
promotes it’, there is still the question of what kind
of growth and what sort of implications it has for a
broader conception of development. Second, the
empirical evidence used to support the case has so far
proven far from convincing; indeed there has been a
tendency to use empirical data like the proverbial
drunk uses the lamp-post – for support rather than
illumination.4 Third, there is a tendency to emphasise
the potential benefits of an idealised conception of
democratic process rather than to base analysis on
the ways in which democracies actually do operate in
poor societies – which are often far from the ideal
type. (For vivid evidence on this, see O’Donnell 1993
on Latin America and Nicro 1993 on Thailand.) 
Second, there is a pessimistic view which regards
democracy as a valuable long-term goal but a
potential impediment to the earlier stages of
development. In other words, democracy is a luxury
which poor societies can ill afford. This view is more
popular among Third World officials who would
agree with Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew when he states
that ‘I believe that what a country needs to develop is
discipline more than democracy. The exuberance of
democracy leads to indiscipline and disorderly conduct
which are inimical to development’.5 The view
receives more detached support from social scientists:
for example, Leftwich (1993: 13) argues that ‘if the
primary developmental objective is the defeat of
poverty and misery, then liberal or pluralist democracy
may also not be what many Third World or Eastern
European countries need or can sustain in their
present conditions’. This pessimism is also shared to
some extent by supporters of democracy who do not
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expect much from procedural democracy at the
national level and therefore concentrate on a
‘bottom-up’ micro-strategy based on the
democratising and developmental potential of
grassroots and community organisations. For
example, Landell-Mills (1992: 10) argues that liberal
democracy will not necessarily lead to economic
growth, or alleviation of poverty, or protection of the
weak, or efficient government. In his view, a strong
civil society must be developed to achieve more
accountable government; but even then, it is ‘perhaps
not wise government’. 
Pessimists tend to list a number of seemingly
insuperable post-transitional obstacles which
Huntington (1991: 209–10) conveniently groups into
two categories, contextual and systemic. The former
stem from the nature of the particular society and
the developmental problems it faces; the latter from
the characteristic ways in which liberal democratic
polities operate. Contextual problems tend to
smother the political system with excessive demands
resulting from a ‘tide of rising expectations’ and
undermine its capacity to process these demands.
Systemic problems derive from the institutionalised
uncertainty, instability and conflict inherent in
democratic politics.6 Both these sets of problems can
lead to political fluctuation, paralysis or disorder
which weaken the capacity of democratic
governments to shoulder the developmental burden,
whether this is defined in narrower regulative or
broader interventionist and redistributive terms. By
contrast, the experience of the ‘rational
authoritarianism’ of the ‘four tigers’ of East Asia is
cited as evidence of a developmentally desirable and
politically appropriate kind of alternative.
However, even four swallows do not make a spring
and the dismal deficiencies of most forms of
authoritarianism outside East Asia weakens any
general case for authoritarianism per se as a political
recipe for developmental success. Authoritarian
polities have their own systemic problems as
developmental agents, such as rigidity, corruption
and rent-seeking, or excessive concentration of
political and economic power, in addition to the
human costs they impose through repression or
denial of civil rights. Indeed, in many countries the
impetus towards democratisation has been fuelled by
the demonstrated developmental failure of
authoritarian regimes. In this context, the pragmatic
case for ‘trying out’ the democratic alternative is
compelling. Perhaps the most we can grant to the
‘rational authoritarian’ argument is that, where a
non-liberal democratic regime demonstrates a clear
capacity to cope effectively with developmental
problems and is not engaged in gross violations of
the civil rights and personal security of its citizens, it
should not be pushed willy-nilly into a wholesale and
immediate adoption of a liberal–democratic polity.
The third view on the relationship between
democracy and development is what one might call
the ‘don’t expect anything’ school. Huntington, for
example, argues that the sustainability of a stable
democracy depends on ‘disillusionment and lowered
expectations’ on the part of the general population.
Furthermore, ‘Democracies become consolidated
when people learn that democracy is a solution to
the problem of tyranny, but not necessarily to
anything else’ (1991: 263). This kind of view is
buttressed by the argument that democratic regimes
are not legitimised by their performance but by their
procedures,7 whereas it is one of the inherent
weaknesses of authoritarian regimes that they have
to derive their legitimacy from their performance
and are thus vulnerable to economic downturns.
Thus inflation over 20 per cent per annum might
shake the foundations of the entire Communist
regime in China, whereas in a democratic context
this might threaten the government of the day, but
not the regime.
This kind of argument may make some sense in
countries which have already achieved a relatively
high level of economic development and still retain a
growth momentum. But it does not cut much ice in
the context of countries faced by a combination of
extreme poverty and massive inequalities on the one
hand and accelerating popular expectations fuelled by
the international demonstration effect on the other.
As Huntington himself (1991: 258) points out, new
democracies face a Catch-22 situation because
‘lacking legitimacy, they cannot become effective;
lacking effectiveness, they cannot develop
legitimacy’. A good deal of the political impetus
behind democratic transition in a country such as
Zambia, for example, was the result of popular
disillusionment with the growth performance of the
previous regime, not necessarily its political character.
In such circumstances, it is probably unrealistic to
assume that populations will lower their
expectations of the political system and be content
with the specific gains, important though they may
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be, which derive from democratic guarantees and
rights. We should add, moreover, that the argument
that the legitimacy of democratic regimes rests on
their procedures rather than their performance
applies primarily to consolidated democracies –
indeed it is one of the hallmarks of democratic
maturity. As Diamond (1992: 35) points out,
‘democracy becomes truly stable only when people
come to value it widely not solely for its economic
and social performance but intrinsically for its
political attributes’. As such, the argument has little
relevance to countries where democracies are still
struggling to consolidate themselves in highly inimical
socioeconomic contexts.
A fourth position on the relationship between
democracy and development is that the nature of the
political regime is not the central issue; rather it is good
governance and state capacity, qualities which can be
developed under different types of regime. In the
context of sub-Saharan Africa, for example, Jeffries
argues that ‘the current moves towards multi-party
democracy are, relatively speaking, an irrelevance’
(1993: 30) and the first priority should not be regime
change but ‘improving the capacity, commitment
and quality of government administration, of
developing an effective developmental state’
(ibid.: 28). He cites the regimes of Rawlings in Ghana
and Museveni in Uganda as examples of ‘relatively
non-corrupt, economically responsible and effectively
reforming authoritarian regimes’ and questions
whether they should have been put under pressure
to convert to multi-party democracies. In essence,
the argument here is for the primacy of constructing
an effective developmental state, whether by
authoritarian or democratic means.
This argument contains much of substance, but is
open to question on several counts. Cases of
authoritarian regimes capable of ‘good governance’
are relatively few. But even in these cases, the issue
of political regime is not irrelevant. Such ‘rational’
authoritarian regimes have costs in terms of their
autocratic behaviour, denial of civil rights and
repression of dissent. Moreover, one can argue that
it is exactly this kind of political and administratively
successful regime that is most ripe and ready for
democratisation, even if we accept Jeffries’ point
that the transition should not be brought about
through a pressured and precipitate transition to
multi-partyism. Casting our net more widely,
however, most authoritarian regimes in Africa and
elsewhere may have laid claim to the title of
‘developmental state’, but have been singularly
unsuccessful in establishing a capacity for good
governance and developmental efficacy. In such
cases, a change in political regime may be highly
relevant as an alternative way of achieving an
‘effective developmental state’. Moreover, we should
take heed of the optimists who argue that certain of
the central characteristic features of liberal
democracies – selection of political leaders through
elections, open and unfettered competition for
political office and the pressures exerted by a free
press and public opinion – are essential mechanisms
for creating a state which is responsive, efficient and
accountable. In situations where authoritarian
regimes have failed (as in much of sub-Saharan
Africa) or been superseded (as in much of East Asia
and Latin America), the question of the relationship
between democracy and development should be put
in more positive terms: to what extent and in what
ways can the parallel priorities of a democratic
political system and an effective developmental state
be achieved in tandem? Can developmental
democracy be ‘crafted’ or ‘designed’? This is the main
theme of the rest of this article.
How to construct a democratic developmental
state: approaching the issue
The analysis which follows rests on several basic
propositions. First, democracy, even in its procedural
or minimalist form, is a massive developmental good
in its own right. By contrast, even the most ‘rational’
forms of authoritarianism have not been valued for
themselves (among the development community, at
least), but regarded as undesirable means towards
desirable developmental ends which could be
dispensed with when their unpleasant, but
historically essential, task was completed. In this light,
any arguments couched merely in terms of the
relative virtues of authoritarianism versus democracy
as alternative means for achieving development are
miscast. A broad consensus has formed around this
idea, extending to include the radical left, partly
because the Leninist alternative has collapsed and
partly because it never delivered much in the way of
democracy in any case. Democratic socialists of
course seek to extend the notion of democracy
outside the polity into the society and economy, but
they are now much more willing to recognise the
inherent virtues of the standard model of liberal
democracy.8 That said, however, there are certain
potential trade-offs and incompatibilities between
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democracy and development which must be
addressed and minimised where feasible. 
Second, in the foreseeable future at least, a
combination of domestic and international pressures
are likely to maintain many of the new democratic
regimes in operation, even if at ‘low intensity’ levels.9
This makes arguments about the relative
developmental advantages of authoritarianism versus
democracy irrelevant in those societies where an
authoritarian alternative is not on the cards.
However, it does give urgency to questions about
how to add substance to democratic institutions in
societies where they are superficially implanted and
how to improve their developmental potential. The
activities of external agents – whether international
institutions, national donors or foreign non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) – can influence
this process for good or ill, depending on the
motives for intervention and the skill with which it is
exercised.
Third, for fledgling democracies to be consolidated
and existing ‘low-intensity’ democracies to be
deepened, effective developmental performance is
essential to avoid the Catch-22 identified by
Huntington. If the socioeconomic preconditions of
democracy do not exist, they have to be created
along with the construction of democracy itself.
Effective developmental performance covers a broad
spectrum of governmental action – including
economic growth, social and physical investment and
redistribution – not merely because these are
desirable in themselves, but also because they are
necessary to the consolidation and deepening of
democracy. The key issue is how to construct a
virtuous circle between socioeconomic development
on the one hand and political development on the
other. By ‘political development’ here we mean both
the construction of efficient and accountable public
institutions and the spread of real as opposed to
titular democratic citizenship and enfranchisement
through an increasingly pervasive process of social
empowerment. 
Fourth, the future of both development and
democracy depends on the ability of a society to
construct an effective developmental state.
Democratisation without a serious effort to reform
and/or strengthen the state may mean that a
diversification of political elites through multi-party
competition will just mean more snouts in the
trough and successful private sector development will
just mean fattening more frogs for snakes. The
democratic developmental state will need to have a
broad writ with at least three basic socioeconomic
functions: regulative, infrastructural and
redistributive.10 It will also need sufficient political
authority and administrative capacity to manage the
social and political conflicts arising both from the
persistence of ‘primordial ties’ and from the tensions
inherent in a successful growth process. 
Fifth, the construction of the democratic
developmental state entails not only the pursuit of
‘good governance’ but also ‘good politics’ in the
sense that the process goes beyond the creation of
sound public institutions to include the character of
political society, the relations between polity and
society, and the political role of organised groups in
civil society.11 Thus the narrow framework within
which conventional development discourse discusses
these problems needs to be greatly expanded and a
wider range of political issues needs to be addressed
explicitly. The common tendencies to discuss
‘politics’ circumlocuitously through coded language
or to avoid ‘politics’ altogether by concentrating on
issues of ‘administrative reform’ or ‘governance’ may
be bureaucratically convenient, but they are
intellectually (and ultimately practically) counter-
productive.
Sixth, a combination of internal and external
contextual factors, the latter including the volatile
nature of the international financial system and
fluctuations in international patterns and terms of
trade, may make the task of developing both
democratic and developmental effectiveness very
difficult. As economies become more open and
porous, they become less autonomous and the
freedom of action of domestic decision-makers is
reduced accordingly. The notion of sovereignty which
underlies democratic authority and accountability is
thereby undermined, with potentially explosive
consequences.12
Developmental democracy by design? Potential
arenas of action
In exploring the possibilities for ‘designing’ a state
which is both democratic and developmental, it is
useful to see ‘democratisation’ not as a relatively
sudden rupture of regime transition, but as a process
of institutional accumulation, built up gradually like
layers of coral. We draw here on Richard Sklar’s
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notion of ‘developmental democracy’. In his
conception, ‘Democracy comes to every country in
fragments or parts; each fragment becomes an
incentive for the addition of another’ and he stresses
the need for ‘political invention and improved design’
of democratic institutions to confront the problems
of development (1987: 714). From this perspective,
the contemporary developmental democrat is a
modern Machiavelli who is constantly seeking to
reconcile the democratic and developmental
imperatives through conscious, incremental
institutional adaptation.
Now we are emerging from the manichean world
of the Cold War which tended to reproduce a
homogenised image of each of the two warring
political systems, there is growing awareness of the
institutional and processual variations among liberal
democratic systems in the industrialised countries.
There is concomitant awareness of the important
variations in the character of capitalism in different
societies. Each national form of democracy takes on
its particular character in response to the specific
character of the society in which it is embedded and
the specific historical conditions under which it
emerges. In the case of the industrialised countries,
there are already attempts at typologies to capture
this diversity. Winckler (1992: 253–4), for example,
when inquiring into the particular form of
democracy towards which Taiwan might evolve,
argues that there are ‘three basic alternatives:
Japanese fiduciary statism, American interest
pluralism, and European consultative elitism’ and sees
Taiwan’s democratic trajectory as a shifting mix of all
three forms. While this and other typologies are
based on the industrialised countries, it is to be
expected that other distinctive forms of democracy
may well emerge in the developing world (just as, for
example, in the economic realm one can talk of
Korean-style or Chinese-style capitalism).13
If one can expect the forms and dynamics of liberal
democracies to vary, the important question for our
inquiry is whether there are particular forms of
democracy which are more suited to tackling severe
developmental challenges. Answers to this question
will clearly vary across countries and an in-depth
configurative approach will be necessary when one
gets down to the brass tacks of institutional change
in any one country. We can begin thinking about
these issues in general terms, however, by identifying
certain key arenas of potential institutional design. 
As the above classification of three ‘models’ of
democracy suggests, democracies differ not merely
in the character of their political institutions, but also
in the ways these interact with society. The
organisation of state–society relations has two basic
dimensions: first, the constitutionally defined realm
of formal political, administrative and legal entities
which set the institutional framework of a
democratic regime and, second, the informal and
formal organisations and channels which connect
politicians, officials and agencies with social
constituencies in ‘civil society’. These could be called
the ‘exterior’ and the ‘interior’ worlds of democratic
politics. Brian Crisp , who has done detailed research
on the latter in the Venezuelan context, calls these
the ‘electoral’ and the ‘consultative’ arenas
respectively and argues that democratic reform must
involve both (1993: 1501). The ‘interior’ arena is
particularly important in societies in which
socioeconomic resources are highly unequal, since it
is the context within which powerful elites can
interact with their political and governmental
counterparts and influence the policy process in their
favour. If we are interested in the interaction
between democratic institutions and developmental
capacity, therefore, the ‘consultative’ arena should be
a particular focus of attention, particularly if we are
interested in extending political access and influence
to a wider range of social groups.
As an initial attempt to impose some kind of
analytical order on these complex and multi-
dimensional processes, we can separate out three
political terrains as potential arenas for institutional
‘crafting’: formal state institutions, political society
and civil society. Let us discuss each in turn.
z The institutional design of the state. There is a
range of institutional alternatives in designing
political and governmental agencies which may,
by their impact on the internal structure of the
regime and its channels of communication and
access to political and civil societies, affect its
capacity for stable, coherent governance and
developmental decision. This involves areas of
traditional political engineering such as electoral
systems, decentralisation and devolution of
government, administrative reform, legal systems,
division of powers (notably differences between
presidential and parliamentary systems) and the
nature of legislatures. Various questions suggest
themselves if we are primarily interested in the
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extent to which specific institutional alternatives
can improve a polity’s capacity to tackle serious
developmental issues. For example, what kind of
voting system would increase the chances of
producing more integrative political parties
capable of providing programmatic alternatives
and credible government? Will a presidential or a
parliamentary system better enable democratic
polities to grasp developmental policy nettles? 14
Will decentralisation improve the responsiveness
and accountability of government and, if so, in
what forms? These elements of democratic
polities are constant subjects of academic
research and political debate in the industrialised
countries, yet with a few exceptions (such as
decentralisation) there has been comparatively
little work on the new democracies.
z The character of political society. Political
society refers primarily to the nature of political
parties which function as crucial links between
citizens and governance. The conventional notion
of democracy current in development circles
includes a ‘multi-party system’ as a central
defining element. But a consistent strand in
thinking about the relationship between
democracy and governance in the industrialised
world, at least in Anglo–America, has been that
‘multi’ should ideally denote no more than two
since a two-party system can combine the
advantages of both political competition and
stable governance, as opposed to multi-party
systems which have to survive through shifting
and often unstable coalitions which make the
definition and implementation of long-term
policies more difficult. One might go further and
argue that the best potential underpinning for a
developmentally effective polity is a one-party
dominant system. Some of the most impressive
democratic developmental performers over the
past half century, notably Sweden and Japan and
more recently Botswana, have had one-party
dominant systems, which, in their cases at least,
seem to have combined the best of both
developmental and democratic worlds. The
dominant party was subject to regular democratic
tests at the ballot box and constantly subject to
the pressures of a free civil society, while at the
same time maintaining the coherence, authority
and capacity for long-term decision-making
which is necessary for tackling the structural
problems of development.15 The post-
authoritarian political elite in South Korea – with
the Japanese precedent very much in their minds
– has sought to forge just such a dominant-party
system through the amalgamation of the former
ruling party and part of the opposition parties, in
an attempt to retain the previous developmental
capacity of the state in the new democratic
context. 
z The character and role of civil society. The
nature and impact of democratic political
institutions are heavily influenced by the character
and behaviour of organised groups in ‘civil society’:
their heterogeneity, their capacity to coalesce,
and the nature of their relationships with the
parties and state institutions. If we focus on the
‘one-party dominant model’, for example, these
interrelations between the state, political society
and civil society have taken two basic forms –
inclusive and exclusive – typified by Sweden and
Japan. In the former, there is a broadly based
‘social compact’ involving an ‘inclusive coalition’
between the main segments of civil society,
brokered and organised by the state and a
dominant political party (in the Swedish case, this
involved the Social Democratic Party, business and
labour). In the latter, there is a pact of domination
involving an alliance between state institutions, a
dominant political party and a hegemonic section
of civil society (in the Japanese case, the
components have been the state bureaucracy, the
Liberal Democratic Party and big business);
something similar may be evolving in South Korea
and Taiwan. 
This area of discussion leads us naturally to the issue
of corporatism as a specific way of organising the
links between state, political society and civil society
so as to create the political consensus, stability and
capacity needed for longer-term developmental
decision-making (e.g. Cheng and Krause 1992
advocate an explicitly corporatist model for South
Korea). However, corporatist systems are notoriously
difficult to establish and maintain (Bianchi 1986),
particularly so in more heterogeneous and schismatic
societies in which democratic rule, to be stable and
effective, may need to organise the relationships
between civil society, political society and the state in
very different ways: for example, along the lines of
‘consociational’ democracies analysed by Lijphart
(1968) or the kind of political subsidiarity which
Parekh (1992) has argued as one of the fundamental
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underpinnings of stable democracy in India. Such
solutions, while improving the developmental
capacity of the national political system, may have
problematic distributive and redistributive
consequences if the dominant coalition, whether
inclusive or exclusive, only includes a relatively
narrow, and relatively influential, section of society,
the remainder being weakly represented or
unrepresented in the political process. Thus, such a
macro-strategy of ‘developmental democracy’ could
ideally be complemented by a micro-strategy, along
the lines advocated by David Korten (1990) and
Pierre Landell-Mills (1992), based on a commitment
to associational mobilisation of politically
marginalised groups which function both as an
alternative developmental agency to the state and as
a source of political pressure on the state.
Some concluding remarks
The above analysis has sought to suggest some new
ways of thinking about the relationship between
democracy and development and hopefully point the
debate in a more positive and practical direction. It
has raised more issues than it can answer, but with
the intention of mapping out a preliminary agenda
for a broad, comparative research programme on the
intricate relationships between democracy and
development. However, this preliminary mapping
needs to be taken further before detailed research
can commence. For example, the issues of feasibility
and agency need to be systematically addressed. On
the question of feasibility of institutional ‘design’ or
‘crafting’, to a considerable extent institutions rest on
and are moulded by profound structural factors – the
specific character of the social and economic
structure, the dominant systems of cultural thought
and behaviour, the specific impact of the state-based
and international constellations of power, and the
constitution of civil and political societies – which
set, and often radically reduce, the room for political
manoeuvre. On the question of agency, much of the
analysis of the process of ‘democratisation’ in the
sense of regime transition has emphasised the
importance of human, particularly elite, agency in
‘crafting’ transitions at this crucial genetic phase of
democratic polities.16 In such fluid and malleable
situations, the parameters for institutional design and
creativity may be relatively flexible. However, if we
understand ‘democratisation’ in the longer-term
sense of the consolidation and deepening of
democratic institutions and predispositions, there is a
‘settling in’ process, like ships in the mud, whereby
evolving institutions become increasingly embedded
in the deeper structures of power and interest in
society and become harder to change in
consequence. To the extent that this is true, the role
of what I would call ‘positive’ external conditionality
– do this, or else – in constructing democratic
developmental states is likely to be minimal, though
‘negative’ conditionality – don’t do that, or else –
could still be applied to issues such as human rights
abuse. On the other hand, there is a continuing role
for external assistance in the process of institutional
development, though this would need to be based
on the demand or consent of the recipients and very
carefully focused to avoid negative political
consequences. 
There is also a need to think systematically about the
political dynamics of democracies in developing
societies. First, it is important to seek a more precise
understanding of their power dynamics – the extent
to which different groups and interests gain access
to political power in a democratic context and the
resulting consequences for development policy.17
Understanding of political dynamics also requires
analysis of the roles of the ‘electoral’ and
‘consultative’ arenas of political action and the
relationship between real as opposed to formal
‘citizenship’.18 These will help to generate greater
awareness of the political coalitions behind
institutional change in general and behind efforts to
construct democratic developmental regimes in
particular. Second, we need a more precise knowledge
of their actual operating processes, particularly in the
light of our growing awareness of the darker
dynamics of ‘advanced’ democratic systems in Italy,
France, the UK and Japan. How do democracies
actually work in different social–economic–cultural
contexts as opposed to how they are supposed to
work – detailed studies of countries such as Thailand,
Venezuela or the Philippines would be instructive in
this regard. Third, to enable us to think more clearly
about the potential synergy or trade-offs between
development and democracy, it would be important
to investigate the experience of societies where a
democracy has gone hand in hand with a certain
degree of developmental success (perhaps Botswana,
Mauritius or Venezuela) and compare them with
other societies where the presence of a democratic
polity has been cited as an impediment to
development (e.g. India). In addition, one could
inquire into the impact of recent democratisation on
the developmental capacity and performance of East
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Asian NICs such as South Korea and Taiwan and
investigate how domestic political actors are trying
to cope with the problems which arise.
Effective developmental performance is crucially
important for the political future of the new
democracies of the erstwhile Third World. While
conditions over recent years have favoured their
emergence, one should not be complacent about
their future. If they are developmentally ineffective, a
vicious downward spiral of mutually reinforcing
economic and political decline may well set in.
Moreover, if they continue to rest on vast inequalities
and remain as oligarchic ‘semi-democracies’
operating largely in the interests of dominant elites,
their role as agents of both democratisation and
development will be severely circumscribed. If they
are not successful in ‘producing the goods’, they will
be prey to authoritarian reversals based on ideologies
which thrive on the ideas that democratic polities
are inherently corrupt, divisive, unstable or
ineffectual. 
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Notes
1 Huntington (1991: 7) uses the procedural notion
when he argues that a polity is democratic ‘to the
extent that its most powerful collective decision-
makers are selected through fair, honest, and
periodic elections in which candidates freely
compete for votes and in which virtually all the
adult population is eligible to vote’. 
2  For an overview of the most recent wave of
democratisation in the developing world, see
Luckham and White (1975). 
3 For a well-argued exposition of this position, see
‘Democracy and Growth: Why Voting is Good for
You’, The Economist, 27 August 1994: 17–19.
4  For example, the reader is invited to see whether
he/she is convinced by the evidence for the
putative ability of democratic regimes to carry out
sweeping programmes of economic reforms
reported in the above article in The Economist, or
the evidence adduced to support the judgement
that ‘democratisation promotes economic
development’ by Shin (1994: 156–7). For a review
of statistical analyses of the relationship between
democracy and development, see Moore (1975).
5  Cited in The Economist, 27 August 1994: 17.
6  For instance, Huntington (1991: 210) lists problems
which ‘tend to be peculiarly characteristic of
democratic systems: stalemate, the inability to
reach decisions, susceptibility to demagoguery,
domination by vested economic interests’.
7  For example, Linz and Stepan (1989) make this
argument in the South American context.
8  For an early ‘socialist–revisionist’ discussion of these
issues in the African context, see Sandbrook (1988).
9  The idea of ‘low-intensity democracy’ is discussed
in Gills, Rocamora and Wilson (1993).
10 By ‘regulative’ functions, we refer to the role of
the state not only in ongoing macroeconomic
management but also in constructing the
institutional framework necessary for the
functioning of complex market economies.  By
‘infrastructural’ functions we refer to the process
of creating both physical and social infrastructure,
the latter pursued through growth-enhancing
social policy and welfare provision. By
‘redistributive’ functions we refer to the need to
tackle absolute poverty and ameliorate morally
repugnant, economically unproductive and social
destructive forms of severe inequality.
11 For a discussion of the ideas of ‘political society’
and ‘civil society’, see White (1994).
12 The relationship between democratic authority and
national sovereignty in the context of the post-
Cold War world order is discussed by Held (1993).
13 For an illuminating analysis of different forms of
capitalism among the East Asian NICs, for
example, see Whitley (1994).
14 O’Donnell (1992) discusses some of the pitfalls of
presidentialism in the Latin American context.
15 For a comparison of ‘one-party dominant
regimes’, see Pempel (1990); for a study of one-
party dominance in Botswana, see Molutsi and
Holm (1990).  Di Palma (1990) discusses the
difficulties involved in establishing such systems
and Ferdinand (1994) argues that the global
dynamics of the post-Cold War era are
undermining these systems. The recent experience
of the Mexican PRI regime may be good evidence
for his argument.
16 For a review of this literature, see Shin (1994:
38–41). To the extent that the institutional
arrangements which emerge from these elite-
defined transitions reflect the interests of these
very elites, one of the most urgent, and
developmentally crucial, elements of democratic
consolidation is to improve the political access of
wider sections of society and involve them in the
process of institutional ‘crafting’. In the history of
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Western societies, for example, the role of labour
parties based on an organised working class
played an important role in providing the political
impetus for and designing the central features of
their ‘welfare states’.
17 For example, there is a potential conflict between
a neo-liberal regulative strategy and a
redistributive poverty-oriented strategy in terms
of the power weightings behind each strategy
which are actually revealed in the political process.
18 The extreme inequalities of most developing
societies tends to mean that access to political
power is seriously maldistributed, notwithstanding
the countervailing influence of electoral politics.
In power (and therefore policy) terms, in
consequence, developing democracies tend to be
characterised by a powerful ‘core’ dominated by
well-resourced elites and a powerless ‘periphery’
of effectively disenfranchised citizens. To the
extent that this is true in any given society, there
would seem to be a case that a large proportion
of external ‘development aid’ should be aimed at
counter-balancing this structural asymmetry. 
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